[Full-Disclosure] Cisco Code Train matrix (mystery IOS vulnerability)
jeremiah at nur.net
Thu Jul 17 08:38:10 BST 2003
> Hi.. merely reporting what information we had available,
> and as far as I know it was the ONLY source of information
> at the time. Perhaps Cisco could post something sooner next
Here is CERT:
CERT® Advisory CA-2003-15 Cisco IOS Interface Blocked by IPv4 Packet
Original release date: July 16, 2003
Last revised: --
A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.
All Cisco devices running Cisco IOS software and configured to process
Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) packets
A vulnerability in many versions of Cisco IOS could allow an intruder to
execute a denial-of-service attack against a vulnerable device.
Cisco IOS is a very widely deployed network operating system. A
vulnerability in IOS could allow an intruder to execute a denial-of-service
attack against an affected device. Cisco has published an advisory on this
topic, available at
strongly encourage sites using IOS to read this document and take
The CERT/CC is tracking this issue as VU#411332. This reference number
corresponds to CVE candidate CAN-2003-0567.
By sending specially crafted IPv4 packets to an interface on a vulnerable
device, an intruder can cause the device to stop processing packets destined
to that interface. Quoting from Cisco's advisory:
"A device receiving these specifically crafted IPv4 packets will force the
inbound interface to stop processing traffic. The device may stop processing
packets destined to the router, including routing protocol packets and ARP
packets. No alarms will be triggered, nor will the router reload to correct
itself. This issue can affect all Cisco devices running Cisco IOS software.
This vulnerability may be exercised repeatedly resulting in loss of
availability until a workaround has been applied or the device has been
upgraded to a fixed version of code."
Apply a patch from Cisco
Apply a patch as described in Cisco's Advisory.
Until a patch can be applied, you can mitigate the risks presented by this
vulnerability by judicious use of access control lists (ACLs). The correct
use of ACLs depends of your network topology. Additionally, ACLs may degrade
performace on some systems. We recommend reviewing the following before
The CERT Coordination Center thanks Cisco Systems of for notifying us about
this problem and for helping us to construct this advisory.
Feedback about this advisory may be directed to the author, Shawn Hernan
This document is available from:
CERT/CC Contact Information
Email: cert at cert.org
Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
Fax: +1 412-268-6989
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
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Copyright 2003 Carnegie Mellon University.
July 16, 2003: Initial release
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