[Full-disclosure] Sniffing RFID ID's ( Physical Security )
Josh L. Perrymon
joshuaperrymon at gmail.com
Tue Jun 27 05:11:23 BST 2006
I was contacted by Eweek recently about previous posts about RFID and how it
is being used at the World Cup and Olympics. This got me thinking a little
more about some previous ideas I have had. I think the real risk is in RFID
World Cup and Olympics are / will be using embedded RFID chips in tickets to
ID ticketholders. Upon buying the tickets patrons provide a lot of personell
This is stored in a Database and I suppose a unique ID is assigned to each
ticket holder. Now internal security can identify each ticket holder and do
whatever they want with the data. ( ID terrorists so on, I dont care. )
Risks: Not a lot here-
As long as the ID used on the ticket is unique and not associated with
personell details. An attacker would have to embed an SQL injection into
the RFID ticket or another RFID chip in their pocket to be parsed by the
RFID reader / backend. I have't been involved in many of these systems but I
will bet that input validation may not be built into the SDLC. But overall,
injecting SQL to get a remote connection may be fairly involved and take
several attempts. But deleting the DB may be a lot easier.
My ideas on RFID risk in its current implementation:
I'm thinking a lot of the risk with RFID would be within ID cards and
physical security. I have been in 100's of companies that use RFID ID cards
for physical security to access a building. Just rock up and swipe your
badge in front of the reader right???
What if an attacker was sitting at the cafe downstairs sniffing RFID ( Well,
sending out RFID signals to power the chips and get a response ). Wouldn't
it be trivial to obtain the STATIC ID codes stored on the RFID chips and
write them to a generic chip? THis new card could easily be used to walk
right in to the target company? As we all know.. once your inside it's
trivial to root the entire network. Just insert your usb/ CD with an
autorun backdoor sploit connecting outside OR plug in a small wireless AP.
Go back down to the coffee shop and hack away.
Is anyone addressing this RFID issue for access cards? At MINUMIUM a private
PIN# should be used with this type of ID.
I'd like to hear your ideas / comments.
Packet Focus Security Research
josh.perrymon at packetfocus.com
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