[Full-disclosure] [Full-Disclosure] (Psexec on *NIX)

Tyop? tyoptyop at gmail.com
Fri Feb 2 15:51:36 GMT 2007


On 2/2/07, Raj Mathur <raju at linux-delhi.org> wrote:
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> On Friday 02 February 2007 12:08, Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu wrote:
> > On Fri, 02 Feb 2007 13:25:11 +0800, Eduardo Tongson said:
> > > On 2/2/07, Xavier Beaudouin <kiwi at oav.net> wrote:
> > > <>
> > > > Allowing direct root login even with SSH is IMHO stupid...
> > > Please elaborate why is it IYHO stupid.
> > In environments where more than 1 person has root access, allowing
> > direct login to root means you can't keep an audit trail of which
> > person logged in.
> >
> > And if your environment only one person has root access, that's
> > just looking for a DoS if the one person is hit by a bus.....
>
> I believe we have had this discussion before, but I'll iterate my
> beliefs in favour of allowing direct root access again:
>
> - - Password management is a bitch.  I don't remember passwords for
> about half the accounts I have.  Using a key-based root login, I
> don't need to remember those passwords either.  If you take the sudo
> route, every user has to remember each password for each account,
> unless you take the deprecated route of reusing passwords (or
> *horrors* allow sudo without password).

key-based login without passphrase is like eating cheese without
bred. useless (IMHO).

> - - With a little bit of configuration, it's easy to figure out which
> key was used to login to an account; the audit trail can be managed
> that way.
> - - Managing which users have access to which root accounts is trivial
> this way: just add or delete their keys from .ssh/authorized_keys[2].

Totally agree.

-- 
Tyop?
http://altmylife.blogspot.com




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