[Full-disclosure] OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory

[Tim Dierks]

On Fri, Aug 8, 2008 at 1:43 PM, Dan Kaminsky <dan at doxpara.com> wrote:

> It's easy to compute all the public keys that will be generated
>> by the broken PRNG. The clients could embed that list and refuse
>> to accept any certificate containing one of them. So, this
>> is distinct from CRLs in that it doesn't require knowing which servers
>> have which cert...
>>
> Funnily enough I was just working on this -- and found that we'd end up
> adding a couple megabytes to every browser.  #DEFINE NONSTARTER.  I am
> curious about the feasibility of a large bloom filter that fails back to
> online checking though.  This has side effects but perhaps they can be made
> statistically very unlikely, without blowing out the size of a browser.
>

Using this Bloom filter calculator:
http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~manolios/bloom-filters/calculator.html , plus the
fact that there are 32,768 weak keys for every key type & size, I get
various sizes of necessary Bloom filter, based on how many key type / sizes
you want to check and various false positive rates:
 * 3 key types/sizes with 1e-6 false positive rate: 2826759 bits = 353 KB
 * 3 key types/sizes with 1e-9 false positive rate: 4240139 bits = 530 KB
 * 7 key types/sizes with 1e-6 false positive rate: 6595771 bits = 824 KB
 * 7 key types/sizes with 1e-9 false positive rate: 9893657 bits = 1237 KB

I presume that the first 3 & first 7 key type/sizes in this list
http://metasploit.com/users/hdm/tools/debian-openssl/ are the best to
incorporate into the filter.

Is there any chance it would be feasible to get a list of all the weak keys
that were actually certified by browser-installed CAs, or those weak
certificates? Presumably, this list would be much smaller and would be more
effectively distributed in Bloom filter form.

 - Tim
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